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PREVIEW; City of Helena v. Parsons:
Reckless Vigilante or Good Samaritan Done Wrong?
Matthew Paoli-Asaro

Oral arguments for City of Helena v. Parsons are scheduled for
Wednesday, July 25, 2018, at 9:30 a.m., in the Courtroom of the
Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building in
Helena, Montana. Lance P. Jasper is expected to argue on behalf of
the Appellant, Ronald S. Parsons, and Assistant Attorney General
Mardell Ployhar is expected to argue on behalf of the Appellee City
of Helena.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises from Ronald Parsons’ (“Parsons”) actions
that ended a police chase outside an elementary school in Helena in
March of 2016.1 The city of Helena (“Helena”) charged Parsons
with negligent endangerment and reckless driving because he
maneuvered his truck and trailer to block the route of a suspect
evading law enforcement, which caused the suspect to crash.2 The
Arrest by a Private Person statute authorizes a person to use
reasonable force to arrest another when there is probable cause to
believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense.3
Parsons attempted to use this statute as a defense, but was barred
from doing so as both the municipal court and the district court
concluded that the statute was inapplicable to Parsons’ criminal
case.4 The jury was therefore not instructed on the statute in any
way, and Parsons was convicted on both charges.5 Parsons appeals
what he contests were substantially prejudicial rulings, which led to
his conviction.6 The main issue here is whether, by not instructing
the jury on the Arrest by a Private Person statute, the court
substantially prejudiced Parsons and deprived him of a fair trial.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 13, 2016, Chris Moore led Lewis and Clark
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, City of Helena v. Parsons,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/
connector/8/449/url/321Z246_03W910E6F002H27.pdf (Mont. May 21, 2018)
(No. DA 17-0576).
2
Id.
3
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46–6–502(1) (2017).
4
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 6-7.
5
Id. at 3.
6
Id. at 6.
1
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County Sheriff’s Deputy Greg Holmlund on an extensive highspeed chase through residential and school areas.7 Ronald Parsons,
the Appellant, observed the chase while driving his truck and towing
his boat.8 As the chase approached him, Parsons maneuvered his
truck and boat trailer to block the path of the fleeing Moore.9 Moore
lost control of his motorcycle and crashed.10 He suffered injuries and
was detained by police and charged with several offenses.11 For his
part in detaining Moore, Parsons was charged with negligent
endangerment and reckless driving.12
Parsons pled not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the Arrest by a Private Person statute authorized him to stop the
chase.13 The municipal court denied the motion, explaining it was
not clear why Parsons had acted, and the statute only provides
immunity from civil liability, not criminal.14 Later in the
proceedings, the City filed motions to exclude any affirmative
defenses Parsons might argue and to exclude several jury
instructions, including one regarding the Arrest of a Private Person
statute.15 After a hearing on the motions, the municipal court ordered
that Parsons could not use the Arrest by a Private Person statute as
a defense because it does not apply to the criminal charges against
Parsons.16 The court explained it had already decided it was not
relevant in Parsons’ initial motion to dismiss.17 The lower court also
considered it an affirmative defense, which would have required
written notice of the defense to the court and to Helena.18
In his statement at trial, Parsons was allowed to explain his
thought process and the reasons for his actions without support from
the Arrest by a Private Person statute in any manner of jury
instruction.19 The jury in the Helena Municipal Court convicted
Parsons of both charges. The district court upheld the conviction and
remanded the case back to the Municipal Court for sentencing.20
Parsons was sentenced on September 20, 2017. He now appeals his
7

Id. at 4.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 5.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 3.
13
Id. at 2.
14
Brief of Appellee at 5, City of Helena v. Parsons,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/9/
450/url/321Z24D_040WFTGRV0003WV.pdf (Mont. April 6, 2018) (No. DA
17-0576).
15
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
16
Brief of Appellee, supra note 14, at 9.
17
Id. at 9.
18
Id. at 7.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 3.
8
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conviction of negligent endangerment and reckless driving.21
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The Arrest by a Private Person statute authorizes a private
person to use reasonable force to detain an individual whom he or
she has probable cause to believe is committing or has committed
an offense, and the existing circumstances require the individual’s
immediate arrest.22 The statute further requires that the private
person making an arrest immediately notify the nearest available
law enforcement agency.23 The parties disagree as to whether this
statute is relevant to the present matter, and accordingly, whether
the jury should have been informed of it.
In order to find Mr. Parsons guilty of negligent
endangerment, the jury had to find that he consciously disregarded
a risk, and that to do so was a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.24
To find him guilty of reckless driving, the jury had to find that he
operated a vehicle with “willful or wanton disregard . . . for the
safety of persons or property.”25 Parsons argues the Arrest by a
Private Person statute would controvert these findings of
recklessness and negligence because the jury would see his actions
through a different lens of reasonableness.26 The State contests the
conviction on these two charges proves that Parsons was acting
recklessly and negligently, and therefore the force used could not
have been reasonable.27
A. Appellant Ronald Parsons
Parsons believes the jury should have had an opportunity to
measure the reasonableness of his conduct in light of the Arrest by
a Private Person statute.28 Parsons argues that if the jury had been
informed of the statute, he would have been less likely to be
convicted.29 He contests the Municipal Court should have either
permitted him to raise the statute as a defense, taken judicial notice
of the statute, or instructed the jury of the statute.30 By failing to
inform the jury of the statute in any manner, Parsons contends he
21

Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–6–502(1).
23
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–6–502(2).
24
Brief of Appellee, supra note 14, at 13.
25
Id.
26
Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 11.
27
Brief of Appellee, supra note 14, at 15.
28
Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 20.
29
Id. at 11.
30
Id. at 6.
22
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was substantially prejudiced.31
Parsons mainly focuses on the lower court’s allegedly
erroneous designation of the Arrest by a Private Person statute as an
affirmative defense, which generally requires a defendant to give
notice. Parsons believes the statute is a negative defense.32 He
distinguishes that while an affirmative defense requires a defendant
to admit to the act charged but “seeks to justify, excuse or mitigate
it,” a negative defense serves to controvert an adversary’s claim.33
Parsons does not admit to acting recklessly or negligently.34
Additionally, there is no basis under statutory or case law to
conclude the Arrest by a Private Person statute constitutes an
affirmative defense.35
Essentially, Parsons argues the statute would provide an
alternative lens of reasonableness through which a jury could
evaluate his conduct. Parsons concludes by arguing he was
substantially prejudiced when the jury did not have the opportunity
to evaluate his conduct in light of the statute.36 Had the jury been
given that opportunity, Parsons contests, he would have been less
likely to be convicted.37
B. Appellee City of Helena
The City of Helena side-steps Parsons’ affirmative defense
argument and instead focuses on the relevance of the statute to the
case. It argues that the lower courts were correct in that the statute
does not provide a defense to the offenses with which Parsons was
charged and is therefore irrelevant.38 Accordingly, Parsons’
substantial rights were not violated by failing to inform the jury of
the statute in any manner.39
The City continuously asserts that the statute does not
provide a defense to the offenses with which Parsons was charged.40
This is in part because Helena claims the statute only provides civil
immunity, not criminal immunity.41 It further supports the assertion
31

Id.
Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 7-8.
33
Id.
34
Appellant Reply Brief at 3, City of Helena v. Parsons,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/
connector/10/451/url/321Z25P_051C158ZD00001K.pdf (Mont. May 22, 2018)
(No. DA 17-0576).
35
Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 12; see also MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-15-323(2)).
36
Id. at 10.
37
Id. at 1.
38
Brief of Appellee, supra note 14, at 8.
39
Id. at 9.
40
Id. at 9, 11, 12 and 14.
41
Id. at 6.
32
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that the statute does not provide Parsons a defense with three
arguments: 1) Parsons did not have probable cause to arrest
Moore,42 2) Parsons created a roadblock, he did not effectuate an
arrest,43 and 3) Parsons’ conduct was unreasonable due to the nature
of the charges.44 Helena adds that since the statute does not establish
what is reasonable, it would have been confusing to the jury.45 The
City concludes that since the statute is not explicitly a defense to the
charges, Parsons was not deprived of a fair trial when the jury was
not informed of the statute.46
IV. ANALYSIS
It is likely the Court will remand to the lower court for a new
trial where the jury may be instructed on the Arrest by a Private
Person statute. First, the statute does appear relevant to the charges.
Second, the failure to instruct the jury did prejudicially affect
Parsons’ substantial rights. The jury was tasked with assessing the
reasonableness of Parsons’ conduct without knowing Montana law
expressly states that it can be reasonable for private citizens to
forcibly detain another person under certain circumstances.47
A. The Arrest by a Private Person Statute is relevant.
Parsons’ defense relied almost exclusively on the Arrest by
a Private Person statute.48 The City presents a series of seemingly
scattered arguments to demonstrate the statute is not relevant.
However, there is no law to support Helena’s assertion that the
Arrest by a Private Person statute only provides civil immunity. It is
neither stated in the statute, nor is it a principle of common law.
Separately, written notice of a defense is required to prevent surprise
and to assist in orderly trial administration.49 There is no indication
that such a requirement applies to the defense Parsons raises.50
Nonetheless, Parsons provided verbal notice to Helena and the court
at the omnibus hearing on May 11, 2016.51 Regardless of how the
defense is categorized, Parsons notified opposing counsel early on
of his intention to use the defense.
Addressing the remaining arguments, it can be reasonably
42

Id. at 13.
Id.
44
Id. at 15.
45
Id. at 14.
46
Id. at 20.
47
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10.
48
Id. at 18.
49
City of Missoula v. Paffhausen, 289 P.3d 141, 149 (2012).
50
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-323(2).
51
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15.
43
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concluded that after observing the chase twice, Parsons had probable
cause to believe a crime was being committed.52 As to whether
Parsons effectuated an arrest, the Court has adopted three elements:
1) authority to arrest, 2) assertion of that authority with intention to
affect an arrest, and 3) restraint of the person.53 The Arrest by a
Private Person lends Parsons the authority he would not otherwise
have to effectuate an arrest.54 The City’s final argument—that the
nature of Parsons’ charges suggests he was not acting reasonably—
is circular. The jury made its determination without the knowledge
that a private person can have authority to effectuate an arrest. The
finder of fact must know what the law deems reasonable before
making a factual determination as to whether a particular person
acted unreasonably. With these circumstances in mind, the Court
should find the statute is relevant to the matter.
B. Not instructing the jury on the Arrest by a Private Person
statute was substantially prejudicial to Mr. Parsons.
The purpose of jury instructions is to “fully and fairly
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.”55 Reversible error
occurs only if the jury instructions prejudicially affect the
defendant’s substantial rights.56 Ultimately, the jury must determine
what is reasonable, but it must do so with a complete understanding
of the relevant laws. The Court has stated that “in determining
whether a prohibited statement contributed to a conviction, we
consider the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the
prejudicial effect of the testimony, and whether a cautionary jury
instruction could cure any prejudice.”57 By relying on the statute,
Parsons attempted to refute Helena’s contention that he grossly
deviated from the standard of care a reasonable person would
have.58 The statute could alter the lens through which the jury would
evaluate his conduct. Failing to instruct the jury about the lawful
authority of a private person to effectuate an arrest, in a case where
a private person appears to effectuate an arrest, would deprive that
defendant of a fair trial. It is likely a jury would see Parsons’ actions
differently when provided with a statute that may warrant his action.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court should vacate Parsons’ conviction and remand
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 34, at 3.
State v. Thorton, 708 P.2d 273, 277 (1985).
54
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-502(1).
55
State v. Dunfee, 114 P.3d 217, 221 (2005).
56
State v. Gray, 102 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2004).
57
State v. Scarborough, 14 P.3d 1202, 1220 (2000).
58
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 9.
52
53
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this case for a new trial, finding that the Arrest by a Private Person
statute is relevant and the jury should have received an instruction
on it. It is up to the jury to determine if Mr. Parsons’ conduct was
reasonable within the context of the situation and in light of the
statute. After instructing the jury of all the relevant laws, the court
can be confident Parsons will have been afforded a fair trial
regardless of the jury’s ultimate determination.

